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It is often necessary to make a decision based on information
which is sufficientfor action but insufficient to satisfy the intellect.
Immanuel Kant, 1786
“Critique of Pure Reason.”
   
  
1.0 Introduction
Article 2 of the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement contains a policy that states that the
discharge of any or all persistent toxic substances
shall be virtually eliminated. In 1990 the Interna-
tional Joint Commission, which is responsible for
assisting the Parties to the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement,
set up a Virtual Elimination Task Force to integrate
Commission activities concerning this policy. In
1991, the International Joint Commission directed
the Great Lakes Water Quality Board to assist the
Virtual Elimination Task Force (VETF) in holding a
workshop on the legislative and regulatory aspects of
virtual elimination drawing on previous work
undertaken by the VETF. The Board was asked to
address such issues as the institutional, bureaucratic
and legal barriers to achieving Virtual elimination of
 
persistent toxic substances and the interim measures
that can be taken pending statutory law reform.
The workshop was held at the Hilton Hotel, Windsor
on June 17 and 18,1992 and included presentations
by invited speakers and four breakout sessions to
discuss questions on the adequacy of the existing
legal framework, barriers to achieving virtual elimi-
nation, jurisdictional roles and responsibilities and
the concept of reverse onus. The results of the
workshop and the subsequent consideration of the
topic by the Board are outlined in this report.
The Board recommends as a general working
principle that the Parties strengthen pollution
prevention programs to reduce or eliminate the
creation ofpollutants or wastes at the source.
  
 2.0 Criteria for Selecting
Existing Chemicals for
Virtual Elimination
  
The Board recognizes the extensive work that has
been done in previous years to prepare lists of
existing chemicals for various purposes, including
lists of chemicals of concern and of chemicals whose
manufacture, use and release should be prohibited.
In particular, the Board recognizes work undertaken
by the Parties to prepare the three lists pursuant to
the Supplement to Annex 1 of the 1987 Protocol to
the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
Criteria to include a substance on a list have gener-
ally been based on consideration of the physical,
chemical and toxicological characteristics of a
particular substance based on controlled laboratory
experimentation. This practice, however, has
resulted in extensive lists of existing chemicals that
are impractical for initiating regulatory programs for
virtual elimination, not only because of the limited
resources available but also because of the inherent
usefulness of many of these substances to society.
The Board recommends that a speciﬁc list ofpersis-
tent toxic substances, which will be consideredfor
virtual elimination, needs to be developed and
 
Widespread agreement reached and the immediate
attention of the regulatory agenciesfocused on that
list.
The Board recommends that priorityfor the
selection of chemicals for Virtual elimination be
put on those that are persistent, bioaccumulate,
are highly toxic and have already exhibited
toxicological cause-ejfectin the Great Lakes
ecosystem.
In this way scarce regulatory resources can be
focused on achieving the virtual elimination policy
through actions that will be ofmaximum beneﬁt to
the organisms [including humans) dependent on the
Great Lakes. This does not preclude a secondary set
of criteria for selecting substances based on the
physico-chemical and toxicological properties to
identify existingchemicals for which no toxicologi-
cal cause-effect has been demonstrated in the Great
Lakes ecosystem, but that should be assessed in
detail to prevent injury to human health or the
environment.
 
  
3 .0 Adequacy of
Existing Legal Authority
’_____
In considering whether the existing legal authority is
adequate in relation to the Agreement policy on
virtual elimination of persistent toxic substances, the
Board has distinguished between legal authority and
effective authority. The Board noted that the law is
effective only if it is implemented and enforced.
Until there is a change in action or behaviour, the
ecosystem does not beneﬁt.
Persistent toxic substances pose special problems in
terms of legal mandates and authority. Legislation
has been implemented in both the United States and
Canada to control commercial products used as
pesticides, cosmetics, drugs and food additives and
in households and the work place. Legislation to
control efﬂuents and emissions from industries and
municipalities has been in place for several decades.
Similarly, laws and regulations to control hazardous
wastes have been implemented to protect society and
remediate hazardous waste sites. Despite this
legislation, persistent toxic substances continue to
enter the Great Lakes ecosystem, cause injury to fish
and wildlife resources, and affect human perinatal
development.
In the early 19703, the two countries started to recog-
nize this particular deﬁciency in their respective
legislation and explored ways to develop legislation
that deals with the special characteristics of persistent
toxic substances. There was a recognition that sub-
stances in this class were not only persistent and toxic
but also bioaccumulated in food chains and, if re-
leased to the environment, were irretrievably
dispersed over the globe by hydrologic and atmo-
spheric processes. Thus, these substances not only
could not be assimilated by natural degradative or
detoxiﬁcation processes if released to the environ-
ment, but release to any medium -— water, air or land --
could result in transfers between media. These
substances could not be adequately controlled using
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traditional product legislation or conventional pollu-
tion laws or those governing management of hazardous
wastes. To respond to these deﬁciencies in the laws in
the two countries, new legislation was enacted. In the
United States, Congress passed the Toxic Substances
Control Act to investigate and control these kinds of
substances. In Canada, Parliament passed the Envi-
ronmental Contaminants Act in 1975, which formed
the basis of the Toxic Substances Section of the 1988
Canadian Environment Protection Act. Do these
pieces of legislation contain the necessary powers to
enable the administrations in the two countries to
control persistent toxic substances?
Section 6 of the U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act
states that if the Administrator of the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency finds that there is a
reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture,
processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal
of a chemical substance or mixture presents or will
present an unreasonable risk to health or the environ-
ment, the Administrator shall prohibit or limit these
activities. Section 7 of the former Environmental
Contaminants Act enabled the Minister of Environ-
ment and the Minister of National Health and Welfare,
where they were satisﬁed that a substance or class of
substances was entering or would enter the environ-
ment in a quantity or concentration that constituted or
would constitute a signiﬁcant danger in Canada to
human health or the environment, to prohibit the
import, manufacture, processing, sale, use, or release
of the substance. Similar provisions are found in
subsection 18(1) of the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act which superseded the earlier Environ-
mental Contaminants Act.
The Board ConcIudes that, in terms of authority
contained in the IegisIation, the two federaI gov-
ernments have adequate mandates and authority to
implement the policy contained in the Great Lakes
  
  
Water QualityAgreement concerning the virtual
elimination ofdischarges ofany or all persistent toxic
substances through control ofproducts {see 6.1 below)
and control ofdischarges (see 6.2 below}. The Board,
however, recognizes that there are significant barriers
to effective implementation of this authority.
In addition to these existing legal authorities in the
two countries, there may be incentives for product
substitution and reformulation by industry, because
 
   
the prospect of liability for damage caused by releases
of persistent toxic substances raises the possibility of
litigation. Recent court cases in Canada also point to
the possibility of liability of the Crown for injury
sustained through non-enforcement of regulations.
Before the barriers to achieving virtual elimination of
persistent toxic substances can be identiﬁed, the steps
in the administrative process must be outlined (Figure
1).
Figure 1
Responsibilities of Regulatory Agency when Injury has been caused by Persistent Toxic Substances.
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4.0 Administrative
Procedures
  
‘The release of certain persistent toxic substances into
the Great Lakes has caused injury to ﬁsh and wildlife
resources and probably caused effects on the devel—
opment of infants of mothers who ate Lake Michigan
fish. Before such causal linkages can be made,
extensive research must be undertaken not only to.
describe the syndrome and its geographic and
temporal incidence and severity, but also to demon—
strate experimentally that the suspected causal agent
is speciﬁcally responsible for the syndrome. In
addition, plausible routes of entryand pathways of
exposure of the affected organisms must be docu-
mented.
After these investigations have been undertaken, a
scientiﬁc case may be prepared on which to base
regulatory action. This may include promulgation of
a regulation to prohibit activities involving the
substance, or litigation to cancel registration of a
persistent toxic pesticide. The scientific case may be
transmitted to the administrative body that will
scrutinize it to determine whether action is war—
ranted.
 
If the regulatory agency accepts the scientific find—
ings of injury and is satisﬁed about the causes, it may
review the legal remedies and the technological
options available to overcome the injury. After legal
and technological proposals have been prepared a
socio-economic assessment of the proposed action
must be developed, from which a decision may be
made concerning which legal and technological
options to implement.
After the legal instrument has been developed and
published and adequate provision made for appeal
by interested parties, it may be promulgated.
Through enforcement and compliance activities, the
government attempts to control environmental
exposures to the substance causing the injury.
Through environmental monitoring, the long-term
trends in the concentrations of the substance and the
incidence and severity of the syndrome are docu-
mented from which the effectiveness of the legal
action can be evaluated. If the regulatory action is
successful the injury to fish and wildlife resources
and to human health may be eliminated.
 
  
5.0 Barriers to Achieving
Virtual Elimination
 
The process itself, because of its complexity and
burden of proof, can be a barrier in its own right.
Additional specific barriers are identified in the
following sections of the report.
Workshop participants felt that one of the most
significant barriers to implementing the virtual
elimination provisions is the lack of political will. In
the absence of centralized authority, success depends
on harmonizing programs in many agencies at
different levels of government, and on a level of
goodwill between individuals and agencies involved.
The dynamic tension between science, public policy
and economics also contribute as barriers to the
successful control of a substance that has caused
injury.
The workshop was successful in identifying some of
the major impediments to the virtual elimination of
persistent toxic substances and restoration of the
biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes.
These include: identification of the injury and the
causal agents; preparation and transmission of a
valid scientific case; challenges through litigation;
failure in the past to use an interagency multimedia
approach; the absence of waste destruction technol-
ogy and of requisite economic resources; and
determination of what constitutes acceptable water
quality objectives. The Board notes the necessity of
lessening the length of time between recognition of
effects and the effective response of governments to
curtail the injury.
5.1 Identiﬁcation of the Injury
and the Causal Agents
Traditional regulatory approaches to toxic substances
have been concerned with potential effects on aqua-
 
tic resources and their protection through setting
water quality objectives and monitoring for viola-
tions. While this approach has resulted in signi-
ficant improvements in water quality, it has not been
effective in addressing the actual injury to ﬁsh and
wildlife resources and human health as a result of
exposures to persistent toxic substances such as
PCBs and dioxins. Not only is funding generally not
available for research on injury, but from a research
scientist’s career standpoint this kind of science
yields less predictable results and may detract from
potential for advancement. How research is funded
and organized thus presents signiﬁcant barriers to
obtaining evidence and rationale necessary to
implement the virtual elimination policy.
One of the first barriers is in the identiﬁcation of the
injury. Much of the damage that has occurred in the
Great Lakes over the past forty years, has been so
subtle, though biologically signiﬁcant, that even
skilled biologists have had difﬁculty recognizing
injured populations. A second research barrier is
that some causal agents, such as specific PCBs and
dioxins, have only been analytically identiﬁable in
the past decade. Other agents, such as DDT and
dieldrin, were determined up to thirty years ago.
5.2 Preparation and Transmission
of a Valid Scientiﬁc Case
Historically, government scientists have been
rewarded based on productivity which is usually
measured by the number of publications in the peer-
reviewed scientific literature. Preparation of a
scientific case relating injury to a causal chemical
agent may take considerable time and warrant only
infrequent publication. While criteria have been
broadened to include other contributions for promo-
  
 tion, few scientists have the background or skills to
carry out this work.
A second problem is in deciding what constitutes a
valid scientiﬁc case relating injury to the causal
agent. Workshop participants noted the amount of
uncertainty that often surrounds evidence of injury
caused by persistent toxic substances and the
difﬁculty in inferring causal relationships and the
opposing claims of “good science” versus “bad
science.” For instance, only one epidemiological
study exists of effects on infant development as a
result of maternal consumption of Lake Michigan
fish prior to pregnancy. Is this study reliable, and is
it scientifically valid? The Board concludes there is
enough evidence to suggest that the risks to humans
are high and there is a real probability that the
effects are important. There has been significant
progress in identifying and applying categories of
evidence in making a case based on epidemiological
criteria. This methodology and six Great Lakes case
studies have been published in the August 1991
issue of the Journal of Toxicology and Environmental
Health.
Once a valid scientiﬁc case has been made it must be
transmitted from the scientiﬁc community to the
regulatory community. These communities have
traditionally been two solitudes with unsatisfactory
communication between them. The science has, at
times, lain dormant in the scientiﬁc literature for
more than a decade until a non government organiza-
tion or the media have prepared a polemic story and
politicized the issue. As a public constituency is
built for the case, the issue may come to the attention
of the politicians and regulatory community. Thus
science has been used to inﬂuence public perception
and thereby used to leverage public policy and risk
perception.
Based on information from the non-government
organizations, the public often perceives that the
causal relationships between the effects and the
exposures to persistent toxic substances are well
understood and accepted. However, public policy
makers who hear both the advocates of and detrac-
tors from the science tend to remain unconvinced
because the data is considered anecdotal and not as
rigorous as experimental or chemical analytical
results. The crux of the matter for regulatory ofﬁcials
is how to make policy decisions in the face of
 
uncertainty, given the implications of making a
decision without a proven cause and effect. The
credibility of regulatory decisions is very important
to the long—term effectiveness of a regime. In turn,
the public questions why the regulatory authorities
do not move more quickly. The present system of
regulation does not generally make provision for
applying the weight of evidence approach. This is a
significant impediment.
At the workshop, there was extensive discussion on
whether the need to take action should not be
proportional to the degree of potential harm or actual
injury. On the one hand, some participants ques-
tioned Whether the level of environmental control
should not be related to the confidence in the
evidence of injury and the strength of the causal
association since costs -— such as product substitu-
tion or industrial process change -- associated with
prohibiting the use or release of a substance may be
very large. On the other hand, others noted the costs
to society of the injury caused by these kinds of
substances, including the loss of ﬁsh andwildlife
resources and increased health and educational
costs. The policy maker is constantly trying to
balance the severity or stringency of the regulations
against the costs of losing a valuable natural resource
or causing impaired human health or development.
With the introduction of legislation concerning
damage assessment, the liability for injury caused by
persistent toxic substances released from industrial
and municipal facilities is accelerating the process of
product and process substitution. The Board
concludes that the injury caused by certain persistent
toxic substances has been so extensive and the costs
to society so high that immediate measures are
warranted not only to restore the environment and
the affected populations offish and wildlife, but also
to protect human health from continuing exposures
and to prevent further releases.
While the Board endorses the various programs being
implemented by the Parties on pollution prevention,
it notes the extreme length of time between the past
introduction of a substance into commerce, the
documentation of socially unacceptable damage, the
control of the substance, and the ﬁnal remediation
and restoration of the injured populations.
The Board recommends that the Parties devise
more efﬁcient and effective ways to investigate
 
  
injury caused by existing chemicals and be pre-
pared to reallocate funds and human resources,
where required.
The Board recommends to the Commission that the
Research Inventory prepared by the Council of
GreatLakes Research Managers be used to evalu-
ate the adequacy of the allocation offunding to
investigate actual injury to fish and wildlife
resources and to human health caused by expo-
sures to persistent toxic substances.
The Board recommends that the Parties give
consideration to the development andprovision of
incentives for scientists to become involved in
cause-effect research, promote broader science
assessments in a weight of evidence approach, and
make the information widely available to the
scientiﬁc community and the public.
5.3 Challenges through Litigation
and Administrative Process
Once the regulatory community accepts the evidence
from the scientific community of the causal relation-
ship between the presence of the persistent toxic
substance and the consequent injury and proposes
regulatory action to remedy the injury, industry may
bring a legal challenge to modify or overturn the
proposed action. For instance, the asbestos industry
successfully challenged the regulatory action pro-
posed by U.S. EPA under the Toxic Substances
Control Act on the grounds that the regulation was
not the least burdensome means available.
DDT was introduced for widespread use in 1945 and
dieldrin in 1957. In the cancellation proceedings on
DDT and dieldrin brought under the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act in the early
1970s, industry sought to retain the registrations of
these compounds by unsuccessfully challenging the
evidence of damage brought before the US. EPA
administrative law judge by the Environmental
Defense Fund. Similarly, the PCB regulation and the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act are being
challenged in the Supreme Court of Canada (see
below 6.0-]urisdictional Roles and Responsibilities).
 
The Board recognizes the beneﬁcial role interventions
by industry and environmental advocates can contrib-
ute to the assessment of scientiﬁc evidence and to
discussions of proposed regulatory actions. Regulatory
agencies are encouraged to ensure that a balance of
views prevails and that mechanisms are in place to
encourage the input of all stakeholders. Decisions
should be based on an objective assessment of scien-
tiﬁc evidence, not the degree of access which certain
segments of society have to senior policy ofﬁcials.
5.4 Interagency Multimedia Approach
Substances such as PCB, DDT and dieldrin pose
special problems for regulatory authorities. Not only
do they enter the different media of the environment
through different routes, but they also move between
media when released. Regulatory control of release
into the environment through one route of entry may
result in releases into other media, thereby continu-
ing the injury. Most agencies are organized on a
media-speciﬁc basis reﬂecting the media-speciﬁc
legislation they administer, and thus regulatory
control of a persistent toxic substance within a
facility tends to be uncoordinated. Similarly, most
regulatory controls are developed on an industry-
specific basis, while these substances have been used
in many industrial sectors. Thus, industry—speciﬁc
controls are only partially effective.
Although the US. Toxic Substances Control Act and
the former Environmental Contaminants Act of
Canada were explicitly drafted on a multi-media
basis, traditional media-specific agencies have been
slow to reorganize and reallocate funding to imple-
ment multi-media controls based on these acts.
Agencies have preferred to implement separate
controls on these substances through the existing
media-specific organizations. Efforts to implement
multi-media controls through coordination of single
media permits are complex and have met with only
limited success. A new strategy is needed on how to
deal with multi-media exposures and releases.
The Boardrecommends that the Parties examine the
administrative arrangements within existing regula-
tory authorities to ensure that multi-media control
strategies andmechanisms become the norm.
 
  
5.5 Lack of Acceptance of Waste
Destruction Technology
and Absence of Economic Resources
In the mid 1970s, it became clear in both countries
that use of PCBs must be controlled and eventually
prohibited. It also became clear that if there was
insufﬁcient destruction technology available to
destroy the waste PCBs, complete prohibition at that
time would have created a larger toxicological hazard
than allowing continued use in closed systems such
as transformers and capacitors. As an example, high-
temperature destruction of PCBs in modified cement
kilns was an early proven technique but was not
implemented because of public concern. Large
stores ofPCB wastes must be monitored until
acceptable waste technology becomes available.
Incineration of wastes has, however, been prohibited
in some jurisdictions and this is a serious impedi-
ment to achieving virtual elimination of persistent
toxics. A life cycle approach must be taken in
dealing with persistent toxic substances because of
the direct relationship between, for example, a policy
decision to destroy waste PCBs or to prohibit the use
of PCB.
Several participants at the work sessions considered
the economic and technological costs of achieving
virtual elimination of persistent toxic substances
since these are directly implied as a result of legisla—
tive and regulatory actions. Some suggested that
special economic instruments such as surcharges, tax
abatements, grants and loans or accelerated deprecia-
tion of capital investments were required to ﬁnance
change. The liability inherent in managing wastes of
persistent toxic substances has recently encouraged
their destruction rather than storage or release to the
environment. Some suitable technology for destruc-
tion of persistent toxic substances is available but the
existing capacity across the two countries is insufﬁ-
cient. New technology is being developed and, after
trials, may be approved for service. Technology is
also available for cleanup of contaminated sediments
and poorly constructed chemical landﬁll sites.
The Board recommends that the Parties develop
strategies andpolicies that encourage the destruc-
tion ofpersistent toxic substances rather than
storage or release to the environment. More
 
specificallyfor waste PCBs, the Board supports the
use ofapproved and encouragement of emerging
technology, since the risks associated with contin-
ued use and storagefar outweigh the risk of
environmental damage from destruction of the
wastes.
5.6 Water Quality Objectives
The release of any substance to the environment as a
result of human activities has the potential to cause
harm to resources and human health. Thus govern-
ments must deﬁne what quantity or concentration of
a substance is acceptable in the environment and
what releases are “assimilable.” Under Article IV of
the Boundary Waters Treaty a brief paragraph
contains a prohibition of pollution. It states that “it
is further agreed that boundary waters and waters
ﬂowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on
either side to the injury ofhealth or property on the
other.” This short prohibition of pollution has been
the international law governing international fresh-
water resources between Canada and the United
States since 1909. There is no deﬁnition in the
Treaty of what constitutes injury, but the Parties
have generally been able to agree on the meaning on
a site specific basis. The Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement provides a definition of pollution by
prescribing speciﬁc water quality objectives, thereby
identifying lawful and unlawful pollution in the
waters of the Great Lakes drainage basin, and thereby
giving an interpretation of Article IV.
This approach has been remarkably successful in
relation to reductions of loadings of conventional
and assimilable pollutants that cause eutrophication
and local toxicity, and conforms with Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement policy that discharges of
toxic substances in toxic amounts be prohibited. In
essence it has allowed for the release of assimilable
pollutants to the environment. This results in an
ambiguity in relation to the policy on persistent toxic
substances, which states that the “discharge of any or
all persistent toxic substances be virtually elimi—
nated.” Scientists who developed the water quality
objectives do not seem to have differentiated be-
tween persistent toxic substances and toxic
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substances and have not considered, in the policy
sense, the advisability of legitimizing what can be
regarded as a discharge that causes harm. By incor-
porating values for PCB, dieldrin, DDT, and other
persistent toxic substances in Annex 1 of the Agree-
ment, the representatives of the Parties involved in
developing waterquality objectives and the drafters
of the Agreement defined what appears to be accept-
able ambient concentrations for persistent toxic
substances.
The objectives that were derived at the time were
several orders of magnitude too high to restore the
damaged fish and Wildlife resources and to protect
human health because: 1) the bioconcentration
factors in the field are much larger than those
estimated from classical aquatic toxicology experi-
ments; and 2) subtle but ecologically. significant
toxicological phenomena occur at much lower
exposures than previously thought, particularly for
embryonic developmental processes controlled by
endocrine systems. Field data from the Great Lakes
suggest that the water quality criteria for PCB may
have to be revised downward by a factor of 105. This
will have a profound effect on calculations of the
quantities in efﬂuents, emissions and other potential
sources such as landﬁll sites that must be brought
into the ambit of the regulatory community.
The International Law Association, in preparing the
Helsinki Rules, has differentiated between the
equitable use of waters for removal of wastes and a
prohibition on the discharge of substances generally
considered to be highly dangerous into the waters of
an international drainage basin. It would seem that
substances such as PCB, dieldrin, DDT and dioxin
should begenerally regarded as ultrahazardous, and
thus their release to the international waters of the
Great Lakes basin should not be legitimized by
promulgating water quality objectives for these
substances.
The Board concludes that there is no acceptable
assimilative capacity for persistent, bioaccumulative
toxic substances in the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem
and thus the only appropriate water quality objective
that should be included in the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement for these substances is zero.
 
The Board concludes that for persistent toxic sub-
stances it is not appropriate to attempt to set
ambient water quality objectives in the environment,
except when such objectives are recognized as
interim steps as they are in the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement. For such substances it is neces-
sary that the policy of Virtual elimination be directly
implemented through elimination from use, the
deployment of best available treatment technology
and destruction from all other sources.
The Board recommends that the Parties apply
water quality objectivesforpersistent, bioaccumu-
Iative toxic substances onlyfor the purpose of
establishing benchmarks or interim guidelines or
regulations. The Board recommends that the
Parties recognize, both directly and implicitly, that
persistent substances which are both highly toxic
and bioaccumulative cannot be tolerated by the
Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem and should be
virtually eliminated. Before the end of the next
biennial period, the Parties should prepare plans
and schedule datesfor implementation of the
Virtual elimination policy.
 
6.0 Jurisdictional Roles
and Responsibilities
 
Because the Great Lakes resource is shared by two
nations, there is agreement that the federal govern-
ments must ensure a consistent approach to product,
processing and pollution control and to water
quality. This consistent approach is essential to
implement a fair economic basis for industry within
and between the two countries. While the more
effective action is binational, it may be more feasible
to obtain unilateral action on one side of the border
or the other.
In addition to the role of national and local govern-
ments, because persistent toxic substances move
between countries and continents through atmo-
spheric, aquatic and biological processes, it is
essential that prohibitions on activities involving
specific persistent toxic substances be undertaken on
a global level. For example, there is no prohibition
on the manufacture of DDT in the United States for
export to other countries. Use in the recipient
country may lead to atmospheric translocation back
to the United States and to the Great Lakes basin.
Thus, the virtual elimination policy cannot be
attained without an international treaty for com-
pounds such as DDT. The Montreal Protocol, which
includes a scheduled reduction in manufacturing of
chloroﬂuorocarbons is an example of the kind of
international action needed.
The Boardrecommends that the United States and
Canada become advocates for an international
convention to achieve global action to prohibit the
manufacture, export, sale, distribution, use and
release ofDDT, dieldrin, PCB and chlordane.
In both countries there are two major areas of
responsibilities for protecting human health and the
environment from substances that enter the environ—
ment. These are: 1) control of the commercial
 
aspects such as manufacture, import, export, distri—
bution and sale of the substances; and ii) control of
the disposal or of the release of the substances to the
environment.
6.1 Product Control
UNITED STATES
In the United States, the control of products in
interstate commerce is the jurisdictional responsibil-
ity of the federal government, under the Commerce
Power of the Constitution. Thus the US. Federal
Government is involved in regulation of the quality,
for instance, of food, drugs, cosmetics and pesticides.
In 1976, when the damage caused by certain persis-
tent toxic substances -- particularly PCBs -- became
intolerable, Congress found that:
1) Human beings and the environment are being
exposed each year to a large number of chemi-
cal substances and mixtures;
2) Among the many chemical substances and
mixtures which are constantly being devel-
oped and produced, there are some whose
manufacture, processing, distribution in
commerce, use, or disposal may present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment; and
3) The effective regulation of interstate commerce
in such chemical substances and mixtures also
necessitates the regulation of intrastate com-
merce in such chemical substances and
mixtures.
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Congress then set out the policy of the United States
and the intent that:
1) Adequate data should be developed with
respect to the effect of chemical substances
and mixtures on health and the environment
and that the development of such data should
be the responsibility of those who manufacture
and those who process such chemical sub-
stances and mixtures;
2) Adequate authority should exist to regulate
chemical substances and mixtures which
present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment, and to take action
with respect to chemical substances and
mixtures which are imminent hazards; and
3) Authority over chemical substances and
mixtures should be exercised in such a manner
as not to impede unduly or create unnecessary
economic barriers to technological innovation
while fulfilling the primary purpose of the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to assure
that such innovation and commerce in such
chemical substances and mixtures do not
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment.
Intent of Congress: — It is the intent of Congress
that the Administrator shall carry out this Act
(TSCA) in a reasonable and prudent manner,
and that the Administrator shall consider the
environmental, economic, and social impact of
any action the Administrator takes or proposes
to take under this Act.
Thus in terms of control of substances that are likely
to present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or
the environment, Congress enacted legislation that
clearly showed that it believed it had a mandate in
this area and intended to assess and control these
kinds of risks though it tempered this authority with
economic considerations. Though TSCA has been
used to prevent the entry into US. commerce of
many new substances, the act has not been used to
control any existing substance other than PCB which
was mandated under Section 6(e). Proposed regula-
tory controls of existing substances have been
successfully litigated by industry on the grounds that
 
the proposed regulation was not the least burden-
some means available. The Board concludes that the
requirement in the Toxic Substances Control Act,
that the Administrator use the least burdensome
means available for proposed regulatory controls of
substances that present an unreasonable risk of
injury to health or the environment, has rendered the
act ineffective for timely control of existing chemi-
cals. Since TSCA is the only piece of US. legislation
designed to investigate and control new substances
an_d existing substances on a multi-media basis, the
requirement that the Administrator use “the least
burdensome requirements" to protect human health
or the environment against unreasonable risk of
injury has become unworkable.
CANADA
The situation in Canada is more complex because no
constitutional head of power similar to the US.
Commerce Power exists, either under the British
North America Act of 1867 or the Constitution Act of
1982. These limitations were explored in detail in
1972 by the Legal Subcommittee of the Cross Mission
Task Force on Environmental Contaminants Legisla-
tion in their deliberations on a constitutional basis
for a proposed Environmental Contaminants Bill.
The Legal Subcommittee noted the existence of
provincial legislation to control products for con-
sumption and use, to protect humans. It also noted
the existence of provincial laws and regulations to
control the release of substances to all three environ—
mental media.
The Legal Subcommittee, in making the case for new
federal legislation, stated that, “The release or escape
to the environment of certain substances, which are
known or potential contaminants, poses a national,
rather than a purely local, problem. It is, therefore, a
federal responsibility to identify these substances
and to ensure that appropriate controls are imposed
in the national interest. It is also clear that existing
federal legislation, no matter how well armed, is not
designed to deal with the problem in the comprehen-
sive/substance oriented manner which scientific
considerations dictate ought to be adopted.”
The Legal Subcommittee then reviewed the follow-
ing heads of power that might potentially be
considered as the basis for the proposed legislation:
Regulation of Trade and Commerce; Taxation;
 
 Statistics; Navigation and Shipping; Fisheries;
Criminal Law; Federal Works and Undertakings;
Agriculture; Peace, Order and Good Government;
and Federal Activities. Of these the Criminal Law
and Peace, Order and Good Government were consid-
ered the heads of power with the greatest likelihood of
support to develop a comprehensive and realistic
policy on controlling environmental contaminants.
Thus the resulting Environmental Contaminants Act
was oriented to providing authority to the federal
government to collect information to assess the
dangers posed by particular substances and to control
all activities involving those that were a signiﬁcant
danger to human health or the environment.
The Legal Subcommittee, however, noted that:
“protection of man’s (sic) environment is not the
exclusive domain of Parliament. Under such heads
of power as provincial trade and commerce, provin-
cial and municipal institutions, local works and
undertakings, property and civil rights, matters of a
local and private nature, agriculture and natural
resources, the provincial legislatures can legitimately
claim a substantial interest in and responsibility for
controlling and regulating the release of contami-
nants into the provincial environment.”
In the 19803, there was considerable criticism of the
Environmental Contaminants Act, particularly by
nongovernment organizations, because “only” five
substances had been regulated. An Environmental
Contaminants Act Amendments Consultative
Committee was set up to advise the Minister of
Environment and Minister of National Health and
Welfare. The ministers drafted omnibus legislation
entitled The Canadian Environmental Protection Bill
which included authority to formulate national
environmental quality objectives, expanded the
powers to investigate and regulate “toxic substances”,
including substances new to Canada, and included
authority to regulate fuels and nutrients. Other
provisions included formulation of environmental
quality guidelines for federal works and undertakings
and the authorities contained in the Clean Air Act and
Canada Water Act. The regulation-making power was
generally consolidated and expanded. After consulta-
tion with the provinces the bill was presented to
Parliament and became law in 1988.
There were no court cases involving the Environ-
mental Contaminants Act which could have tested
 
the constitutionality of the legislation. There has,
however, recently been a challenge to the provisions
contained in the Canadian Environmental Protection
Act. This case is still before the Quebec Court of
Appeal. The case is important because it may clarify
the role of the Canadian Federal Government in the
assessment and control of persistent toxic sub-
stances. It is thus briefly reviewed below.
Between December 27, 1989 and January 3, 1990,
PCB-contaminated oil was released from Hydro-
Quebec transformers into the St. Maurice River at
Shawinigan. In June 1990, Environment Canada
charged Hydro-Quebec with: a) releasing the PCBs
in contravention of the Chlorobiphenyls Interim
Order; and b) failing to report the release of a toxic
substance in accordance with paragraph 3b(1](a) of
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. Be—
tween March 4 and 6, 1991 a court case was held and
Hydro-Quebec argued that the Chlorobiphenyls
Interim Order was ultra Vires the authority of the
federal government. On August 12, 1991, Judge
Michel Babin rendered his written judgement for the
case. He concluded that paragraph 6(a) of the Interim
Order could not be authorized under either the peace,
order and good government powers (Le. the national
interest) or the power of Parliament to legislate on
areas of criminal law. Regarding the national interest,
Judge Babin believed that the deﬁnitions of “toxic
substances” and “environment” in the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act are too broad to justify
the power of Parliament to regulate these substances
under its constitutional residual powers. The judge
also believed that use of the criminal law power could
not be justiﬁed because of the broadness of those same
deﬁnitions. On September 11, 1991, the Crown
launched an appeal of Judge Babin’s decision. On
August 6, 1992 the Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the
trial judge’s decision.
The Board notes that the constitutional basis for the
involvement of the Parliament of Canada in manage—
ment of toxic substances is being challenged and
that there is a potential for parts of the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act to become ineffective
in the control of persistent toxic substances.
The Board recommends that the Parties should
improve the effectiveness of the United States’
Toza‘c Substances Control Act and the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act respectively to
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control and virtually eliminate existing persistent
toxic substances to advance the general objectives
contained in the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement.
6.2 Alternatives to the Regulatory
Approach
Workshop participants considered alternatives to the
regulatory approach, since this method of adminis-
tration results in serious delays in protecting the
environment and in implementing remediation.
Alternatives include a negotiated phase-out of
manufacture and use of certain substances such as
has been proposed through the Canadian multi
stakeholder process called Accelerated Reduction
and Elimination of Toxic Substances (ARETS). The
negotiation should set a timetable for implementa—
tion and should include all persons with interest in
the project. A negotiated agreement would be a
voluntary approach that could be codified through a
memorandum of understanding. It is uncertain at
this time as to the legal status or enforceability of
these alternative measures in the two countries.
In parallel with the regulatory approach, the
Board recommends that the Parties pursue a
voluntary approach, involving all interested
parties, to the phase—out of the manufacture and
use of certain persistent toxic chemicals, as a
viable alternative. The Canadian multi-stake-
holder process called the Accelerated Reduction
and Elimination of Toxic Substances (ARETS) can
be considered as a model.
6.3 Control of Releases
UNITED STATES
Authority for control of releases rests primarily with
the federal government in the United States, with
state delivery of the programs for protecting the
environment from toxic substances. The US. Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act are intended to protect
single media based on best available technology.
 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (Superfund) are to manage
solid waste and cleanup of past inappropriate
disposal of toxic wastes. The Federal Insecticide
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act is for registration
and labelling of pesticides and control of how they
are used and released. The Toxic Substances Control
Act is the federal law that was designed to prohibit
releases of speciﬁc toxic substances from all sources
to all media.
CANADA
Under the Canadian constitution the provincial
governments have responsibility for matters of a
local nature which includes most aspects of manage-
ment and control of releases of wastes and toxic
substances. The Ontario Water Resources Act and
the Environmental Protection Act both contain
provisions to issue orders and certiﬁcates of approval
controlling operation of facilities and discharges.
The goal of the Municipal-Industrial Strategy for
Abatement (MISA) program is the virtual elimination
of persistent toxic contaminants from all discharges
to Ontario’s waters.
The Canadian federal government has a series of
legislative authorities governing the release of
pollutants. Section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act
generally prohibits discharge of substances deleteri-
ous to fish or human use of ﬁsh. Regulations are
based on best available technology on an industry
sector basis. Provisions under the Canadian Environ-
mental Protection Act are also concerned with the
release of pollutants. The section on toxic sub-
stances, which incorporates the authorities from the
former Environmental Contaminants Act, contains
legislative provisions to control releases of speciﬁc
toxic substances from all sources to all media.
Because the Canadian Environmental Protection Act
is basad on the Criminal Law and on Peace, Order
and Good Government, it can likely be used for those
substances that are: i) so noxious that involvement
with them would constitute a criminal activity and
ii) so pervasive that they have become a matter of
national concern. Persistent toxic substances such as
PCBs and some other organochlorine compounds
would seem to fit this category.
 
 7.0 Reverse Onus
 
Considerable ambiguity still exists as to what the
concept of reverse onus refers. In the Commission’s
5th Biennial Report, it was considered related to
prevention of harm from new chemicals entering the
market place and to discharges of persistent toxic
substances.
At the workshop, there was agreement that where
new substances are introduced into commerce or
new uses of existing substances are intended, the
proponent should develop adequate information to
enable governments to assess the hazards posed.
This system of reverse onus is now well established
in both countries for new pesticides and drugs that
are designed 'to be biologically active. The two
countries have extensive bureaucracies to evaluate
information on the safety of new chemicals. Because
chemicals are articles of international commerce, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment has developed an agreed list of tests that
must be undertaken and evaluated before marketing
a new substance in OECD countries. Canada is in the
process of promulgating regulations to require this
premarket testing of chemicals under the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA). In the U.S., a
regulation would have to be developed under the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to implement
the OECD decision. The Water Quality Board con—
cludes that the institutional mechanisms and data
requirements for evaluating new chemicals are well
developed in the two countries and internationally.
Is there a role for reverse onus in relation to persis-
tent toxic substances already in commerce? When
certain persistent toxic substances have been re-
leased to the Great Lakes, they have caused injury to
fish and wildlife resources, to the use of the re—
sources, and probably caused effects on human
reproduction and development. When injury of this
 
kind occurs, particularly from transboundary pollu-
tion, the system of justice in both countries places
specific types of responsibilities on governments and
on those governed (see Figure 1). Part of the purpose
of the workshop was to investigate how these
responsibilities are placed relative tothe injury
caused by persistent toxic substances because this
determines the ability of the societies to manage
those materials appropriately. The Board concludes
that when injuryfrom persistent toxic substances
occurs, the role ofgovernment is to secure enough
documentation to support conclusions: i) that injury
has or is likely to have occurred; ii} that a particular
persistent toxic substance{s} is or is likely to have
been the cause; and iii) that a particular party is or is
likely to have been culpable. It seems that when
unlawful damage has occurred, there is a series of
duties for the government to fulfil, but none of this
implies a reverse onus on industry.
At the international level the roles of governments in
relation to injury caused by substances have been
identiﬁed by the International Law Association in
the Helsinki Rules as elaborated at the Montreal
Conference in 1982 dealing with water pollution.
Here there are considerable reverse onus duties.
First, there is the general rule of international law
that a state must not permit the use of its territory for
purposes injurious to the interest of other states in a
manner contrary to international law. Second, where
substantial injury has occurred there is a duty on the
state, in whose territory the water pollution origi—
nated, to abate the pollution and compensate the
injured cobasin state as well as give notice of the
change of circumstances that caused the injury. The
Parties should examine the Helsinki Rules to see
whether the reverse onus principles and rules laid
down by the International Law Association on pollu-
tion of international drainage basins should be
included in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
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